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NOTES 
Police Liability for Creating the Need To Use Deadly Force in 
Self-Defense 
Police officers are granted wide discretion in the use of their fire-
arms.1 Allowing officers some discretion is unavoidable, because they 
must often make difficult decisions in the face of rapidly changing cir-
cumstances. 2 Officers, however, may abuse this discretion and cause 
injury or death unnecessarily.3 In the face of this danger of abuse by 
officers, suspects are, in many states, prohibited from defending them-
selves. 4 While it is better to have a court decide when a police officer 
has abused his discretion than to allow the suspect to make that deci-
sion at the moment of arrest,5 it is not clear what standards a court 
1. An officer is normally authorized to use deadly force even if it is not necessary for self-
defense. Several states, for example, permit the use of such force against a felon involved in a 
crime involving the use or threatened use of deadly force or when there is a substantial risk that 
delay of the suspect's apprehension will cause serious bodily injury or death. See 2 P. ROBINSON, 
CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES§ 142(f), at 139-43 (1984); see also note 2 infra. 
2. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WHO ls GUARDING THE GUARDIANS: 
A REPORT ON POLICE PRACTICES v (1985) [hereinafter U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS]; 
see also P. SCHARF & A. BINDER, THE BADGE AND THE BULLET: POLICE USE OF DEADLY 
FORCE 139-79 (1983) (some decisions are inevitably left to officer's intuition). 
3. Lack of adequate supervision and training may contribute to the abuse of police discretion. 
After New York City implemented new policies relating to police supervision, the number of 
instances of police shooting suspects dropped from 18.4 per week to less than 13 per week. U.S. 
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 44. See also P. SCHARF & A. BINDER, supra 
note 2, at 185-270; Edwards, The Shot in the Back Case: Tennessee v. Gamer, 14 N.Y.U. REV. 
L. & Soc. CHANGE 733 (1986) (cases where police abuse of discretion caused unnecessary death); 
Fyfe, Tennessee v. Gamer: The Issue Not Addressed, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 721 
(1986) (Memphis police use discretion in racially discriminatory manner). 
4. By 1984 approximately seventeen states had, by statute or by supreme court decision, 
limited the common law right to resist an unlawful arrest. P. ROBINSON, supra note 1 
§ 13l(e)(3), at 91 & n.80. Some of these states, however, do permit resistance under certain 
circumstances. Arizona, for example, permits resistance if the officer's physical force exceeds 
that allowed by law. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 13-404(B)(2) (1978). Several federal courts 
of appeals, moreover, generally deny the common law right to resist an unlawful arrest. See, e.g., 
United States v. Danehy, 680 F.2d 1311, 1315-16 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Johnson, 542 
F.2d 230, 232-33 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Cunningham, 509 F.2d 961, 963 (D.C. Cir. 
1975); United States v. Martinez, 465 F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Simon, 409 
F.2d 474, 477 (7th Cir. 1969) (dictum), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 829 (1969). But see United States 
v. Moore, 483 F.2d 1361, 1364 (9th Cir. 1973). 
5. The primary reasons for limiting the common law right to defend against an unlawful 
arrest are that (1) it is futile since the officer carries a gun, (2) it is too uncivilized, and (3) the 
lawfulness of an arrest may be too technical for an arrestee to judge accurately. See, Chevigny, 
The Right To Resist an Unlawful Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 1128, 1136 (1969). But some have sug-
gested that the right to resist an unlawful arrest is of constitutional significance. Wainwright v. 
City of New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598, 613 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting); People v. Cherry, 307 
N.Y. 308, 311, 121 N.E.2d 238, 240 (1954) ("For most people, an illegal arrest is an outrageous 
affront and intrusion - the more offensive because under color of law - to be resisted as ener-
getically as a violent assault."); Chevigny, supra, at 1138-39. 
1982 
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should apply in evaluating the officer's behavior. To shed light on this 
confusion, this Note focuses on a controversial subset issue: the liabil-
ity of a police officer who unnecessarily creates the need to use deadly 
force in self-defense. In one case, for example, a police officer violated 
procedure by abandoning the cover of his squad car and, as a result, 
was forced to shoot and kill a suspect who he erroneously believed was 
reaching for a gun. 6 
Courts have looked to criminal law, 7 state tort law, 8 as well as to 
the U.S. Constitution9 in evaluating such conduct. As well as dis-
agreeing over what substantive law to apply to officers, courts disagree 
over which constitutional analysis to apply. This Note seeks to resolve 
this confusion by evaluating the different approaches courts have cho-
sen and determining which of them is most appropriate. Part I ana-
lyzes the possibility of imposing criminal sanctions on police officers 
who have abused their discretion, but concludes that imposition of 
such sanctions would be unfair to police officers and could chill the 
legitimate use of deadly force. Even assuming that it would be fair to 
impose criminal sanctions, this section concludes that an officer who 
creates the need to use deadly force should be granted a self-protection 
defense. Part II briefly analyzes the possibility of imposing state tort 
liability, and concludes that the imposition of such liability would be 
an appropriate response. It maintains, however, that only grossly neg-
ligent conduct should be subject to such liability. Part III discusses 
when an officer's misconduct in creating the need to use deadly force 
rises to the level of a constitutional violation subject to liability under 
section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.Io It concludes that 
courts should apply fourth amendment analysis rather than substan-
tive due process analysis in evaluating such conduct, and that an of-
ficer's grossly negligent conduct in creating the need to use deadly 
force should always be found to violate the fourth amendment. I I 
6. Young v. City of Killeen, 775 F.2d 1349, 1351 (5th Cir. 1985). 
7. See Part I infra. 
8. See Part II infra. 
9. See Part III infra. 
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 provides in relevant part that 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation 
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable 
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress. 
42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1982). 
11. The fourth amendment guarantees: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV. 
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I. CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
An officer's conduct that creates the need to use deadly force could 
be redressed through the criminal law; he could be charged with some 
form of homicide if the suspect is killed, or battery if the suspect is just 
wounded. It seems unlikely that an officer could be charged with the 
primary offense of homicide (assuming that the officer did not intend 
to cause the death)12 but he could be charged for his culpability in 
causing the injury. If an officer is negligent in causing a suspect's 
death, he could be sanctioned specifically for that negligence in caus-
ing the homicide (an offense commonly called negligent homicide). 13 
This approach was recently taken in New York. A New York police 
officer was indicted for second degree manslaughter after shooting a 
66-year-old, mentally unstable woman whom he and other officers 
were trying to evict from her apartment. 14 Under New York law, a 
person is guilty of second degree manslaughter if he "recklessly causes 
the death of another person."15 One theory ofliability in that case was 
that the killing might not have been necessary had the officers followed 
different procedures.16 
This section analyzes the two considerations that weigh against im-
12. Intent is normally an element of the primary offense of homicide. For example, under 
New York law, a person commits murder in the second degree when "[w]ith intent to cause the 
death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person." N.Y. PENAL 
LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1987). 
13. For example, in New York, "[a] person is guilty of criminally negligent homicide when, 
with criminal negligence, he causes the death of another person." N.Y PENAL LAW§ 125.10 
(McKinney 1987). A person is guilty of "manslaughter in the second degree" (i.e. reckless homi· 
cide) ifhe "recklessly causes the death of another person." N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 125.15 (McKin-
ney 1987). 
14. People v. Sullivan, 68 N.Y.2d 495, 497-99, 503 N.E.2d 74, 75-76, 510 N.Y.S.2d 518, 519· 
20 (1986) (per curiam). The case received substantial publicity. See, e.g., Purdom, Every Police 
Bullet Fired Must Pass Many Layers of Inquiry, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1987, § 4 (The Week in 
Review), at 8, col. 1. 
15. N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 125.15 (McKinney 1987). See note 13 supra. 
16. In Sullivan, two colleagues of the defendant-officer were overcome by a 275-pound men-
tally-unstable woman as they tried to restrain her using a special bar and hand-held protective 
shields. Since the woman was threatening the officers with a 10-inch knife, defendant-officer, 
fearing for the lives of his colleagues, shot her twice with a shotgun, the first shot apparently 
striking her hand, the second and fatal shot striking her chest. After the Grand Jury indicted the 
officer for involuntary manslaughter, the trial court dismissed the indictment and the Appellate 
Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the Appellate Division. The pri· 
mary issue before the court was whether the conduct of the police constituted "a gross deviation 
from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation." 68 
N.Y.2d at 500 n.1 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(3) (McKinney 1987)). In absolving the 
officers, the Appellate Division had focused on, among other things, the fact that a "dire emer-
gency confronted [them] and the fact that they gave careful and deliberate consideration to the 
possible alternative methods before entering the apartment." People v. Sullivan, 116 A.D.2d 
101, 116, 500 N.Y.S.2d 644, 653, revd., 68 N.Y.2d 495, 503 N.E.2d 74, 510 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1986). 
In reversing the Appellate Division, however, the Court of Appeals focused on the time interval 
between the first and second shot, and held that the Grand Jury was justified in concluding that 
the officer could have been reckless in firing the second shot. 68 N.Y.2d at 500. See also Com-
monwealth v. Boden, 510 Pa. 287, 507 A.2d 813 (1986) (per curiam) (police officer convicted of 
involuntary manslaughter after shooting and killing suspect brandishing an axe handle). 
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posing criminal liability in such situations. The first consideration is 
that the line of causation between the officer's conduct and the sus-
pect's injury is too indirect to conclude that the officer "caused" that 
injury for the purposes of the criminal law. The second consideration 
is that the officer should be entitled to a self-protection defense despite 
his role in creating the need for the defense. 
A. Causation 
In most cases, it would be inconsistent with the principles of the 
criminal law to conclude that an officer's conduct that creates the need 
to use deadly force "caused" the arrestee's injury. For the purposes of 
the criminal law, the defendant's conduct must normally be more than 
the "proximate cause"17 of the victim's injury. Because criminal lia-
bility often entails loss of personal liberty as well as moral stigma, the 
courts have generally imposed such liability only on those who can be 
said to have had meaningful choice in bringing about the harm. 18 
How direct the line of causation must be in order to establish that the 
defendant had such a "meaningful choice" is not always clear. 19 The 
17. The concept of "proximate causation," normally used in determining common law tort 
liability, is an elusive one. Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 314, 414 
N.E.2d 666, 670, 434 N.Y.S.2d 166, 169 (1980). Significantly, however, social policy considera-
tions have persuaded courts to find defendants liable for civil damages even in cases in which the 
line of causation between defendant's conduct and the injury is so indirect that defendant could 
not have had any meaningful choice in causing that injury. See, e.g. In re Kinsman Transit Co., 
338 F.2d 708, 725-26 (2d Cir. 1964) ("Where the line [between liability and exoneration] will be 
drawn will vary from age to age; as society has come to rely increasingly on insurance and other 
methods ofloss-sharing, the point may lie further off than a century ago."), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 
944 (1965). See also H. HART & T. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 205-49 (2d ed. 1985) 
(courts may hold the defendant liable in tort for a harm which would not have materialized but 
for the voluntary intervention of a third person). 
18. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Root, 403 Pa. 571, 576, 170 A.2d 310, 312 (1961) ("Legal 
theory which makes guilt or innocence of criminal homicide depend upon ... accidental and 
fortuitous circumstances ..• is too harsh to be just."); People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 51 N.Y.2d 
295, 414 N.E.2d 660, 434 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1980) ("but for" causation not alone sufficient to estab-
lish criminal liability); see also, J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 255 (2d ed. 
1960) ("Although there is disagreement regarding the penalization of negligent harmdoing, there 
is also a very substantial consensus favoring a definite theory which excludes inadvertence from 
the scope of penal law .... "); HART & HONORE, supra note 17, at 394 ("[Hall's] acknowledge-
ment of the crucial importance of voluntary action [as a basis for criminal liability] seems to us 
correct."). 
19. HART & HONORE, supra note 17, at 397. Indeed, whether or not a sufficient causal 
connection exists is essentially left for case-by-case determination. For example, in People v. 
Kibbe, 35 N.Y.2d 407, 321 N.E.2d 773, 362 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1974), the court held that the actions 
of the defendants must be "a sufficiently direct cause" of the resulting death, which begs the 
question. 35 N.Y.2d at 413 (emphasis in original). For the facts of that case, see notes 25-29 and 
accompanying text. See also People v. Ingram, 67 N.Y.2d 897, 492 N.E.2d 1220, 501 N.Y.S.2d 
804 (1986) (defendant's action need not be sole cause of death); People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 
51 N.Y.2d at 304 focus on culpability includes foreseeability and causation; existence of broad, 
undifferentiated risk held not sufficient iftriggering cause not foreseeable); People v. Cicchetti, 44 
N.Y.2d 803, 377 N.E.2d 739, 406 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1978) (injury caused by defendant need be only 
one of the several injuries that taken together caused death). But see People v. Stewart, 40 
N.Y.2d 692, 358 N.E. 2d 487, 389 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1976) (complications during medical treatment 
for unrelated injury may relieve defendant of responsibility for death). 
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Model Penal Code leaves the question to the common sense of the 
jury.20 This determination is sometimes more easily made if the de-
fendant's conduct is proscribed by the legislature; for such a proscrip-
tion often reflects a legislative determination that the conduct 
"causes" the type of harm that materialized.21 For example, a legisla-
ture proscribes reckless driving, because it believes that such driving 
"causes" injury or death. If a person kills another while driving reck-
lessly, a court could rely on the fact that the legislature has drawn the 
causal link between the reckless conduct and the resulting harm. Be-
cause most states' criminal laws do not address the problem of negli-
gent or reckless arrests, a court may not rely on a legislative 
determination that such faulty arrests "cause" unnecessary injury or 
death to criminal suspects. 
In assessing causation where there is no such legislative determina-
tion, courts often refer to guiding principles. One such principle, that 
of "intervening causes," is relevant to the resolution of the issue ad-
dressed in this Note. According to this principle, the free, deliberate 
and informed intervention of a second actor relieves the first actor of 
liability, so long as the first actor's conduct alone was not sufficient to 
cause the injury.22 This principle is not a fixed rule but is best under-
stood as a guide designed to assist the finder of fact in determining 
whether the line of causation is sufficiently direct to hold a defendant 
liable.23 For example, if the intervening cause is a reflective response 
to the first actor's wrongful act, courts generally find the causal link to 
the first act direct enough to assign liability. In one case where the 
line of causation was deemed sufficiently direct, the deceased slipped 
or fell into a river while attempting to escape from the defendant.24 
Attempting to escape is so nearly reflexive that it seems fair to hold the 
defendant responsible for the resulting harm. 
20. Under the Model Penal Code, a defendant may not be found criminally liable for having 
negligently or recklessly caused a particular result unless her conduct is a "but.for" cause, and 
the harm "is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a (just] bearing on the actor's 
liability." MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.03(3) (1962) (brackets in original). This vague provision is 
designed to leave the jury some discretion in deciding whether a defendant can ·~ustly" be con· 
sidered responsible for a particular harm. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 comment at 261 n.16 
(1985). 
21. See, e.g., Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814 (1920). 
22. See, e.g., HART & HONORE, supra note 17, at 325-40; J. HALL, supra note 18, at 261-70. 
23. The drafters of the Model Penal Code apparently agree that the principle of "intervening 
causation" should be viewed as a guide rather than as a rule. In response to criticism that the 
Code does not give sufficient attention to the problem of intervention by a responsible human 
agent, the drafters explain that it (the Code) neither accepts nor rejects that principle. Rather, it 
leaves it to the trier of fact "to give weight to such variables if it is persuaded that these consider· 
ations are significant in determining whether the occurrence of the actual result had a (just] 
bearing on the actor's liability or the gravity of his offense." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 com· 
ment at 262-63 (1985) (brackets in original). 
24. HART & HONORE, supra note 17, at 330 (citing Regina v. Pitts, Car. & M. 284, 174 Eng. 
Rep. 509 (Nisi Prius 1842)). The defendant was not a police officer. 
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However, a defendant may remain responsible even if the line of 
causation between his act and the injury is interrupted by a nonreflex-
ive human act, as long as that nonreflexive act was accidental (rather 
than willful) and foreseeable. In one case, People v. Kibbe, 25 the de-
fendants had robbed and partially stripped the intoxicated decedent. 
They left him, without his eye glasses, in the middle of a two lane 
highway on a cold winter night, where he was later struck and killed 
by on-coming traffic. The defendants were convicted of murder. The 
only issue on appeal was whether the defendants "caused" the death.26 
The defendants claimed that the death was not a sufficiently foresee-
able consequence of their actions because it was directly caused by the 
intervening action of the car that actually hit the decedent. In denying 
that this intervening cause relieved them of responsibility, the court 
explained that the accident was essentially inevitable since the high-
way was unlit and the oncoming car could not have had enough time 
to stop. Moreover, had the ill-clad decedent not been hit by a car, he 
would likely have died from the cold.27 Since the intervening act and 
the decedent's death were "directly foreseeable,"28 the court upheld 
the conviction. Thus, as Kibbe demonstrates, when the accident is 
foreseeable, accidental human intervention will not absolve the origi-
nal actor of criminal responsibility.29 
A willful human intervention, on the other hand, is more likely to 
break the chain of causation and absolve the original actor of criminal 
responsibility. This holds true because it is generally more difficult to 
foresee what a person will do intentionally than it is to foresee what he 
will do accidentally. For example, in Commonwealth v. Root 30 the 
defendant-drag racer was charged with manslaughter for the death of 
his competitor, who had crashed during the race. The theory of liabil-
ity was that the defendant was "reckless" in choosing to participate in 
such a dangerous activity, and that this "recklessness" caused his 
competitor's death. The competitor apparently had attempted to pass 
the defendant by swerving his car into the left lane, where he crashed 
into an oncoming truck.31 Significantly, the court held that the de-
25. 35 N.Y.2d 407, 321 N.E.2d 773, 362 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1974). See also note 19 supra. 
26. 35 N.Y.2d at 411. 
27. 35 N.Y.2d at 413. 
28. 35 N.Y.2d at 413. 
29. See also Jacobs v. State, 184 So. 2d 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); People v. Kane, 213 
N.Y. 260, 107 N.E. 655 (1915) (medical malpractice does not break chain of causation); Com-
monwealth v. Eisenhower, 181 Pa. 470, 37 A. 521 (1897) (same); cf Stephenson v. State, 205 
Ind. 141, 179 N.E. 633 (1932) (victim's suicide while in deranged mental state caused by being 
kidnapped, assaulted, and raped by defendant was sufficiently direct causation to support convic-
tion); People v. Arzon, 92 Misc. 2d 739, 401 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1978) (arsonist convicted although 
death directly caused by immediately subsequent fire which arsonist did not set); Comment, 31 
MICH. L. REV. 659 (1933) (discussing Stephenson). 
30. 403 Pa. 571, 170 A.2d 310 (1961). 
31. 403 Pa. at 573. 
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ceased competitor's own willful intervening act of swerving into the 
left lane relieved the defendant of criminal responsibility.32 As this 
case demonstrates, an intervening human act that is willful is more 
likely to be deemed sufficiently unforeseeable and absolve the initial 
actor of criminal responsibility. 
Under the principle of intervening causation, an officer's conduct 
that creates the need to use deadly force cannot be said to "cause" the 
suspect's death or injury for the purposes of criminal liability. This is 
because the line of causation between the police officer's act that cre-
ates the need to use deadly force and the injury is interrupted by the 
decedent's willful intervening act of putting the officer in legitimate 
fear for his life. A deliberate, unlawful attack by the arrestee should 
almost never be deemed to be sufficiently foreseeable to invoke crimi-
nal liability; most suspects do not resist police officers because officers 
are normally well-armed, they represent the power of the state, and 
such resistance is unlawful. 
Yet an attack is arguably more foreseeable in cases involving vio-
lent, mentally disturbed people. They cannot be expected to make a 
rational calculation about the success or consequences of an attack. 
Indeed, it was quite probable that the mentally disturbed woman in 
People v. Sullivan33 would attack the officers. Nonetheless, this is not 
a case where criminal liability would be appropriate, even if it were 
established that the officers were culpable in creating the need to use 
deadly force. Although the woman's attack was arguably foreseeable, 
her persistence and energy (she was 66 years old) in carrying the at-
tack out were not foreseeable. Indeed, there was evidence that she 
continued slashing at the officers with her ten-inch knife even after 
being shot the first of two times with a twelve-gauge shotgun.34 Thus, 
this case is not like Kibbe, in which it was foreseeable that a car would 
eventually come along and hit the decedent. 35 
32. The court stated that "the action of the deceased driver in recklessly and suicidally 
swerving his car to the left lane of a 2-lane highway into the path of an oncoming truck was not 
forced upon him by any act of the defendant; it was done by the deceased and by him alone." 
403 Pa. at 576. 
33. 68 N.Y.2d 495, 503 N.E.2d 74, 510 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1986) (per curiam). See notes 14-16 
supra. 
34. There was a dispute between the parties concerning the time interval between the two 
shots and about what happened after the first shot was fired. See People v. Sullivan, 116 A.D.2d 
101, 116-22, 500 N.Y.S.2d at 653-57, revd., 68 N.Y.2d 495 (1986). 
35. The unforeseeability of the persistence of the woman's attack of course would not absolve 
the officer of liability if one agrees with the theory of liability relied on by the Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals did not consider whether the procedures the officers employed in carrying 
out the eviction created the need to use deadly force. Instead, it assumed that the first shot was 
justified and focused solely on the second shot, theorizing that the defendant may have acted 
recklessly in firing that second shot. It pointed out that the second shot may have been unneces-
sary because of the possibility that "(a) the first shot removed the threat of the weapon, (b) five 
seconds passed before the second shot, and (c) defendant's vision was unobscured by a mask." 68 
N.Y.2d at 500. 
August 1988] Note - Police Liability 1989 
B. Self-Protection Defense 
Even if the line of causation between the officer's conduct and the 
suspect's injury is sufficiently direct to impose criminal liability, the 
officer should be entitled to a self-protection defense. This defense 
may be predicated on either of two rationales: the ''lesser evil" justifi-
cation or the "excuse" concept. The "lesser evil" justification operates 
to justify the defendant's otherwise unlawful act if the act represents 
the lesser of two evils.36 For example, a person who burned another's 
field in order to stop a fire from spreading to a nearby town would 
probably escape prosecution for arson because losing one field is a 
"lesser evil" than losing an entire town. Alternatively, the self-protec-
tion defense may be viewed as an "excuse. " 37 The "excuse" defense 
focuses on the pressures under which the defendant acted and gener-
ally absolves him of liability if other people would have acted as he did 
under the same circumstances. 38 The actor is not sufficiently blame-
worthy for the purposes of the criminal law because he did 'not have 
meaningful choice in carrying out the prohibited conduct, and he 
could not have been reasonably expected to resist. For example, an 
innocent actor forced at gunpoint to rob a store would not, under this 
theory, be criminally liable for robbery. Thus, the justification ration-
ale focuses on the unlawful act itself and deems it justified if it repre-
sents the lesser of two evils, while the excuse rationale focuses on the 
36. See, e.g., United States v. Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1972) (whether resistance to 
draft justified by evils of Vietnam War); United States v. Nye, 27 F. Cas. 210 (No. 15,906) 
(C.C.D. Mass. 1855) (whether revolt by seamen justified because ship unseaworthy); People v. 
Unger, 66 Ill. 2d 333, 362 N.E.2d 319 (1977) (whether there is justification for escape from 
prison); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Commonwealth, 119 Ky. 519, 84 S.W. 506 (1905) (whether 
railway accident justified by not having segregated cars). Some states have codified the justifica-
tion defense. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05 (McKinney 1987); see also G. FLETCHER, 
RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 857-60 (1978); MODEL PENAL CODE§ 3.02 (1962). 
37. The self-protection defense is often considered to be predicated on a "lesser-evil" justifi-
cation, see, e.g., P. ROBINSON, supra note 1, § 132, rather than on the "excuse" concept, but the 
"excuse" rationale nonetheless could support such a defense. Cases employing the excuse ratio-
nale are normally categorized by their facts. Such categories include duress, intoxication, and 
insanity. See, e.g., KADISH, SCHULHOFER & PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 788-911 (4th ed. 1983). But the rationale could apply equally in the 
self-protection situation. The self-protection case could be viewed as a form of "duress." The 
"duress" concept generally excuses an actor who is "in a state of coercion caused by a threat that 
a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would not have resisted." P. ROBINSON, supra 
note 1, § 177(a), at 348. Although the typical duress case involves an actor forced to do some-
thing unlawful by a second actor for the benefit of the second actor, see, e.g., State v. Toscano, 74 
N.J. 421, 378 A.2d 755 (1977), the analysis should not differ ifthe facts are changed so that the 
second actor forces the first actor to do something - kill the second actor - in the first actor's 
interest. See generally P. ROBINSON, supra note 1, § 177 (discussion of the duress concept). 
38. G. FLETCHER, supra note 36, at 856. See, e.g., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (discussing insanity defense); State v. Hall, 214 N.W.2d 205 (Iowa 1974) (drug 
intoxication not a defense to murder); Roberts v. People, 19 Mich. 401 (1870) (intoxication a 
defense to charge of intent to murder); State v. Stasio, 78 N.J. 467, 396 A.2d 1129 (1979) (intoxi-
cation not a defense to charge of intent to rob); State v. Toscano, 74 N.J. 421 (1977) (whether 
defendant made out false insurance report under duress); see also MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.08, 
2.09, 4.01 (1962). 
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pressures that the defendant acted under and generally absolves him of 
liability if other people would have acted the same way. Although an 
officer should be accorded a self-protection defense predicated on the 
"lesser evils" justification, he should not be accorded such a defense 
predicated on the "excuse" rationale. 
1. The ''Lesser Evil" Justification 
A self-protection defense based upon the "lesser evil'' justification 
should exonerate an officer whose conduct creates the need to use 
deadly force. In applying this concept to a confrontation between a 
police officer and a suspect, a court would weigh the two evils: the evil 
represented by the harm to the suspect against the "evil" represented 
by the harm to the officer. Since two lives are generally thought to be 
of equal value, the result is not intuitively clear.39 In choosing be-
tween an aggressor and an aggressee, society prefers the aggressee be-
cause it wants to prevent conflict. 40 While this consideration suggests 
a preference for the officer's life, the analysis is complicated by the fact 
that the officer is culpable in causing the aggressor's attack. After all, 
it was the officer's conduct that created the need to use deadly force in 
the first place. Indeed, some states deny the initial aggressee a self-
protection defense if he created the need for the defense.41 The Model 
Penal Code denies the justification if the actor "was reckless or negli-
gent in bringing about the situation requiring a choice of harms. "42 
Thus, if an officer negligently creates the need to use deadly force, he 
could theoretically be held liable for negligent homicide. 
Even assuming, however, that the officer negligently created the 
need to use deadly force in self-defense, he should not be denied the 
self-protection justification. Other considerations must be taken into 
account. The threat of criminal liability could hamper effective law 
enforcement.43 An officer may be reluctant to apprehend a violent 
suspect under difficult circumstances - such as those present in Sulli-
van - if he is afraid that he may be subject to the severe sanctions 
39. See G. FLETCHER, supra note 36, at 858. 
40. Id. The Model Penal Code provides that "the use of force upon or toward another per-
son is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose 
of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occa-
sion." MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1962). 
41. Some states withdraw the self-protection defense whenever the aggressee's conduct con-
tributes in any way to causing the threat of harm, others withdraw the defense when the victim is 
the "initial aggressor," and still others withdraw it when the victim was somehow at fault for 
triggering the threat. Other states still allow an "imperfect defense" when the aggressee is at 
fault with respect to causing the attack. This means that the force of the defense is reduced 
rather than withdrawn, so that, for example, the defendant may be charged with manslaughter 
instead of murder. P. ROBINSON, supra note 1, § 123. 
42. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 3.02(2) (1962). The Code also denies the self-protection defense 
to an actor who provokes an attack with the purpose of causing that attacker death or serious 
bodily harm. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(i) (1962). 
43. See P. ROBINSON, supra note l, § 123(d), at 38; G. FLETCHER, supra note 36, at 797-98. 
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associated with criminal liability. If he does attempt to apprehend 
such a suspect, he may be reluctant to use necessary force, possibly 
endangering his own life and the lives of others. While a suspect's life 
is of great value,44 consideration for his life must be viewed in light of 
his own culpability in attacking the officer or in appearing to attack 
the officer. 45 Society has a strong interest in treating such threats to 
police officers as threats to public order and, therefore, in allowing 
officers to respond quickly and effectively. If the "lesser evil" justifica-
tion is the rationale underlying the self-protection defense, courts 
should grant an officer that defense even if he is culpable in creating 
the need to invoke it. 
2. The Excuse Concept 
The officer, however, should not be entitled to a self-protection de-
fense predicated on the excuse concept if he is at fault for creating the 
need for the defense to arise. The excuse concept focuses on the pres-
sures that the defendant acted under and uses a reasonableness stan-
dard to judge the behavior.46 This concept focuses on the fact that an 
officer acted under the "pressure" of fear for his life, and excuses him 
for firing his gun in self-protection, because it is an instinctive reaction 
to kill rather than be killed.47 This rationale, however, does not affect 
the officer's culpability with regard to the prior act of creating the need 
to use deadly force, because the officer was not under any particular 
excusing "pressure" when he committed that first act. For example, if 
the officers in Sullivan did improperly plan and implement their appre-
hension of the mentally unstable decedent, the earlier improper con-
duct could not be excused by the "pressure" they were later subject to 
when the decedent attacked them. The excuse does not extend back to 
the first act. 
Although an officer who creates the need to use deadly force 
should be granted a self-protection defense, such a defense must be 
predicated on the "lesser-evil" justification, not on the "excuse" con-
cept. Further, since an officer should not be found to have had suffi-
ciently meaningful choice in causing the suspect's death for the 
purposes of criminal liability, the need for the officer to assert the de-
fense should not even arise in most cases. 
II. STATE TORT LAW 
An officer who creates the ne\:!d to use deadly force in self-defense 
could also be subject to liability under state tort law. For example, in 
44. See note 99 infra and accompanying text. 
45. This argument is less compelling in cases where the officer mistakenly, though reason-
ably, believes the suspect is about to attack him. See note 86 infra. 
46. See note 38 supra and accompanying text. 
47. G. FLETCHER, supra note 36, at 856. 
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Young v. City of Killeen, 48 the Fifth Circuit, applying Texas tort law, 
upheld a verdict against an officer who negligently created the need to 
use deadly force.49 In that case, the plaintiff-suspect asserted both 
state law tort claims and a constitutional tort claim under section 
1983.50 
Finding an officer liable in tort for his culpability in causing the 
need to use deadly force would not conflict with tort law notions of 
causation. Some courts, in determining tort liability, do deny the 
plaintiff recovery if his own conduct represents a voluntary and in-
dependent intervening cause of the injury.51 However, a growing 
number of courts "discard causal criteria and apply the theory that if 
the harm is of a foreseeable type and would not have occurred but for 
defendant's negligence, he is responsible, whatever the manner of its 
occurrence or the nature of the intervening acts or events. " 52 Notions 
of tort liability are changing because courts that determine causation 
for the purposes of tort liability are often guided by social policy con-
siderations rather than by the notion that the party burdened with the 
cost of the injury should have had a "meaningful choice" in bringing it 
about. 53 A court, therefore, may find an officer liable for damages de-
spite the suspect's intervening act of attacking the officer. 
Imposing tort liability on officers who caused the need to use 
deadly force, moreover, would not conflict with the rationales underly-
ing the self-protection defense. Imposition of such liability would not 
undermine the "lesser evil" rationale because it would not deter the 
officer from protecting his own life. The threat of tort liability should 
have a much weaker deterrent effect than the threat of criminal liabil-
ity, because civil penalties, unlike criminal penalties, do not involve 
loss of liberty or severe moral stigma. Any deterrent effect resulting 
from the possible imposition of tort liability should be weakened to the 
extent that states or municipalities indemnify officers for acts commit-
48. 775 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1985). 
49. 775 F.2d at 1353. For a discussion of the facts of that case, see notes 84·87 infra and 
accompanying text. 
50. See Killeen, 775 F.2d at 1352-53 (discussion of claims under§ 1983). Part III will ad· 
dress the § 1983 liability of an officer who creates the need to use deadly force in self-defense. 
51. See generally HART & HONORE, supra note 17, at 133-85. (demonstrating that courts 
have historically absolved a defendant of tort liability if the line of causation between his wrong-
ful act and the injury is interrupted by an independent, voluntary act). 
52. Id. at 284 (emphasis added). Plaintiff's contributory fault would not bar recovery since 
contributory negligence and contributory recklessness are not defenses in cases of intentional 
harm. M. FRANKLIN & R. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 
767 (3d ed. 1983). 
53. Social policy considerations include imposing liability on the party better able to bear the 
loss and on the party in the best position to prevent the harm from recurring. See, e.g., In re 
Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 725-26 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1965); 
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461-64, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944) (Traynor, 
J., concurring). 
August 1988] Note - Police Liability 1993 
ted within the scope of their employment. 54 Such states realize that 
officers could become overly cautious and ineffective if personally ex-
posed to tort liability. 55 Although an indemnified officer may still 
, have to suffer the burden of a trial as well as the moral disapproval 
associated with an adverse verdict, these possibilities probably would 
not deter an officer from defending his life. 56 
Imposition of tort liability, moreover, would not conflict with the 
excuse rationale underlying the self-protection defense. 57 The excuse 
concept is predicated on the notion that an actor should not be subject 
to the severe penalties associated with criminal liability if he did not 
have sufficiently meaningful choice in bringing about the injury to be 
considered morally blameworthy.58 Because, however, the penalties 
associated with tort liability are not as severe as those associated with 
criminal liability, courts, influenced by policy considerations, impose 
tort liability even on those not blameworthy in the sense discussed in 
Part I. 59 The reason for according a legal excuse does not exist for the 
purposes of tort liability; therefore, it should not become the basis of a 
self-protection defense to such liability.60 
Courts should apply a "gross negligence" standard in evaluating 
the tort liability of an officer whose conduct creates the need to use 
54. See w. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 
1068 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER]. 
55. See Cass, Damage Suits Against Public Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1110 (1981). 
56. It is common sense that an officer will choose his life over the inconvenience of a trial. 
But this conclusion is open to the criticism that the fear of tort liability may cause the officer to 
hesitate before using deadly force, and that this hesitation could cost him his life. 
It is also important to recognize that if officers are indemnified, the imposition of tort liability 
will still act to prevent the abuse of police discretion, but in a different way. Although the threat 
of civil liability will no longer act directly on the individual officer, it will act on him indirectly. 
This is because a state, burdened with indemnification costs, will have a financial incentive to 
improve its training and supervision of police officers. 
States may also grant their officers immunity predicated on the state's sovereign immunity. 
Some states, for example, grant officers immunity from liability when they carry out discretion-
ary responsibilities. The most common versions of such immunity are (I) full immunity, (2) good 
faith immunity, and (3) immunity for "reasonable" actions. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 895D comment e (1977). Full immunity absolves the officer ofliability in all cases in which he 
is acting within the scope of his employment. A "good faith" immunity would absolve an officer 
acting in the scope of his employment if he had a good faith belief that he was acting consistently 
with his official duty. The third immunity would protect from liability an officer who acted 
"reasonably," that is, without negligence. An officer may also be granted a privilege protecting 
him from liability flowing from decisions that tum out to be correct. The existence of such 
immunities may vitiate the deterrent to improperly executed arrests. 
57. The self-protection defense applied in criminal cases was "taken over as an apt analogy in 
tort cases." M. FRANKLIN & R. RABIN, supra note 52, at 782. See also Crabtree v. Dawson, 119 
Ky. 148, 83 S.W. 557 (1904); Courvoisier v. Raymond, 23 Colo. 113, 47 P. 284 (1896). 
58. See G. FLETCHER, supra note 36, at 798-807. 
59. See notes 51-53 supra and accompanying text. 
60. Although most courts, influenced by the criminal law, allow the excuse concept as a 
defense to tort liability and leave the loss with the victim, other courts do not and thereby shift 
the loss to the defendant who intentionally, though mistakenly, inflicted the harm. PROSSER, 
supra note 54, at 125. 
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deadly force. 61 A gross negligence standard is more lenient than a 
simple negligence standard, but more stringent than a recklessness 
standard. 62 "Simple negligence" is defined as a deviation from "con-
duct of the reasonable person of ordinary prudence under the circum-
stances."63 Under such a standard, acts of mere inadvertence may 
lead to liability. "Recklessness," on the other hand, is "an act ... in 
disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it 
highly probable that harm would follow, and which thus is usually 
accompanied by a conscious indifference to the consequences."64 
Under this standard, the risk of harm must be so obvious that either 
the actor knew of the risk he was disregarding or such knowledge may 
be imputed to him; mere inadvertence is not enough. The two stan-
dards differ in kind rather than degree65 since "recklessness," unlike 
"negligence," involves an element of intent - or imputed intent. 
Neither of these standards is adequate. Application of a simple 
negligence standard would be too harsh. 66 It would be bad policy -
and unfair - to hold an officer accountable for ordinary acts of inad-
vertence, since such acts are all the more likely to occur in the often 
dangerous and unpredictable environment in which police officers 
must operate. 67 At the same time, however, a "recklessness" standard 
would be too lenient, since it would impose liability only on those of-
ficers who commit such "obvious" errors that knowledge may be im-
puted. Even a deviation from normal police procedure may not 
necessarily be deemed "obvious." 
A "gross negligence" standard, on the other hand, would provide 
suspects adequate means to redress injury resulting from the abuse of 
police discretion. "Gross negligence" is not easily defined, 68 but it 
falls somewhere between simple negligence and recklessness. It is per-
haps best understood as aggravated negligence, or a significant devia-
tion from the standard of ordinary care. 69 In other words, unlike the 
61. Only the Fifth Circuit has evaluated an officer's conduct in creating the need to use 
deadly force as a matter of state tort law. That circuit appears to have applied a simple negli· 
gence standard. See note 49 supra. 
62. Prosser criticizes the concept of "gross negligence" as being more than simple negligence, 
less than recklessness, but ultimately undefinable. PROSSER, supra note 54, at 211-14. All of 
these standards of liability are necessarily vague, but the notion of "gross negligence" can be 
made sufficiently clear, at least for the purposes of resolving the issues raised in this Note. 
63. PROSSER, supra note 54, at 209. 
64. Id. at 213. 
65. Id. at 212. 
66. Some states apply a simple negligence standard. See, e.g., Young v. City of Killeen, 775 
F.2d 1349, 1353.54 (5th Cir. 1985). 
67. As Justice O'Connor argued in her dissent in Garner, "The clarity of hindsight cannot 
provide the standard for judging the reasonableness of police decisions made in uncertain and 
often dangerous circumstances." Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1, 26 (1985) (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
68. See note 62 supra. 
69. "Gross negligence" has been defined as 
August 1988] Note - Police Liability 1995 
"recklessness" standard, the risk of harm need not be so obvious that 
the officer's knowledge may be imputed, but, unlike the simple negli-
gence standard, the deviation must be a "significant" one. 70 While 
recognizing the need to grant officers some leeway to commit inadver-
tent wrongs (negligence) without incurring liability, a gross negligence 
standard would provide suspects with a means to redress their injuries. 
It would adequately balance the need to allow officers discretion and 
the need to provide suspects an adequate remedy for unlawful arrests. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 1983 
If a police officer's actions rise to the level of a constitutional viola-
tion, the suspect may seek a federal remedy under section 1983.71 The 
key question in addressing such a claiin under section 1983 is whether 
or not the defendant's action constitutes a constitutional violation.72 
In answering this question, courts have looked to the fourth amend-
ment as well as to the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Although they come to opposite conclusions, the Eleventh and 
Fifth Circuits have both relied largely on the fourth amendment. 73 
substantially and appreciably higher in magnitude than ordinary negligence. It is materially 
more want of care than constitutes simple inadvertence. It is an act or omission ... of an 
aggravated character . • . . It is very great negligence, or the absence of slight diligence, or 
the want of even scant care. 
Altman v. Aronson, 231 Mass. 588, 591, 121 N.E. 505, 506 (1919). See also Grill v. General Iron 
Screw Collier Co., L.R. 1 C.P. 600, 612 (1866) (gross negligence is "ordinary negligence with a 
vituperative epithet") (Willes, J., quoting Rolfe, B., in Wilson v. Brett, 11 M. & W. 113, 152 Eng. 
Rep. 737, 739 (Ex. 1843)). 
70. The "significant deviation" interpretation of the gross negligence standard is not very 
clear itself, since it may be difficult to distinguish deviations from ordinary care from significant 
deviations from ordinary care. It may take an accumulation of case law to give "significant" a 
clear meaning. But it is at least possible to see how the two standards would play out in some 
cases. For example, in Young v. City of Killeen, 775 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1985), the officer would 
not have had to shoot and kill the suspect had he not violated six police procedures. 775 F.2d at 
1352. It seems clear that violation of six police procedures is a "significant" deviation from 
ordinary care, while violation of one procedure may not be. 
71. For the text of section 1983, see note 10 supra. This Part addresses the personal liability 
under section 1983 of the individual officer. Although it is also possible to state a section 1983 
claim against the municipality that employs the officer, such a claim faces serious obstacles. 
First, there is no vicarious liability under section 1983; a plaintiff may recover against a govern-
ment entity only if he shows that his injury was caused by that entity's "policy or custom." 
Monell v. Department of Social Serv. ofN.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Second, states have a 
constitutional immunity to section 1983 suits under the eleventh amendment, which effectively 
limits the form of relief that plaintiffs can recover against states to prospective relief. Quern v. 
Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337-39 (1978). This eleventh amendment immunity, however, does not 
extend to local government units such as municipalities. 
Although section 1983 provides only for the liability of a state actor, an implied cause of 
action, the "Bivens" action, provides for the liability of a federal actor who has violated a consti-
tutional right. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388 (1971). See also Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 
(1983); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
72. For a discussion of the elements of a section 1983 action, see M. FRANKLIN & R. RABIN, 
supra note 52, at 8()()..()3. 
73. See, e.g., Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 15()()..()2 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. de-
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The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have asked whether the officer's con-
duct constitutes a violation of substantive due process under the four-
teenth amendment.74 Finally, the First Circuit has focused on 
whether the officer's conduct represents a violation of procedural due 
process under the fourteenth amendment. 75 
This Part will first evaluate an officer's conduct creating the need 
to use deadly force in terms of fourth amendment analysis. It will 
then address the possibility of evaluating the officer's conduct in terms 
of substantive due process analysis. 
A. Fourth Amendment 
The Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Garner 76 interpreted the 
fourth amendment to require that the police employ "reasonable" 
methods in apprehending suspects even if they have probable cause to 
believe that the suspects are involved in a crime. 77 The police can 
violate the fourth amendment not only by arresting a suspect without 
probable cause, but also by apprehending him using unnecessary force. 
Garner specifically held that it is a violation of the fourth amendment 
for an officer to shoot a fleeing felon unless "the suspect threatens the 
officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that [the 
suspect] has committed a crime involving the infliction ... of serious 
physical harm."78 In Garner, the defendant-officer, responding to a 
burglary report, shot and killed an unarmed teenager, Edward Garner, 
as he apparently fled from the house in question and was about to 
mount a six-foot-high fence at the edge of the backyard.79 
Relying on Garner, the Eleventh Circuit, in Gilmere v. City of At-
lanta, 80 held that an arrest may be "unreasonable" - and therefore an 
unlawful "seizure" under the fourth amendment - if the officer cre-
ates the need to use deadly force. 81 The defendant-officer in that case 
shot and killed the suspect after provoking him by beating him about 
the head.82 
The court allowed that the officer may have legitimately shot the 
nied, 476 U.S. 1124 (1986); Young v. City of Killeen, 775 F.2d 1349, 1352-53 (5th Cir. 1985). 
See also notes 80-88 infra and accompanying text. 
74. See, e.g., Hewitt v. City of Truth or Consequences, 758 F.2d 1375, 1378-79 (10th Cir.), 
474 U.S. 844 (1985); Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1500-01. See also notes 129-54 infra and accompany-
ing text. 
75. See, e.g., Voutour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812, 818-19 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 
1100 (1986). 
76. 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
77. 471 U.S. at 7-8. 
78. 471 U.S. at 11. 
79. 471 U.S. at 3-4. 
80. 774 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1124 (1986). 
81. 774 F.2d at 1501-02. 
82. For the facts of Gilmere, see notes 129-34 infra and accompanying text. 
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suspect in self-defense, but it concluded that "a moment of legitimate 
fear should not preclude liability for a harm which largely resulted 
from [the officer's] own improper use of his official power."83 In eval-
uating the officer's conduct, the court was willing to consider the of-
ficer's conduct before the suspect attacked him instead of simply 
focusing on the officer's conduct at the moment of the attack. 
Unlike the Eleventh Circuit in Gilmere, the Fifth Circuit in Young 
v. City of Killeen 84 did not consider the officer's conduct prior to the 
suspect's attack. Also applying a fourth amendment analysis, 85 the 
court reversed a section 1983 verdict against the defendant-officer after 
his negligent violation of police procedures created the need to use 
deadly force in self-defense.86 The court explained that "[t]he consti-
tutional right to be free from unreasonable seizure has never been 
equated by the [Supreme] Court with the right to be free from a negli-
gently executed stop or arrest."87 In his dissent from denial of certio-
rari in Gilmere, Chief Justice Burger agreed with the Fifth Circuit that 
any use of deadly force in legitimate self-defense is inherently "reason--
able" under Garner. 88 
In determining whether there has been a violation of the fourth 
amendment, 89 courts have employed a balancing test. Courts deter-
mine the "reasonableness" of the conduct by "balanc[ing] the nature 
and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment 
interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged 
to justify the intrusion."90 In applying this test, courts take into ac-
count "not only when a seizure is made, but also how it is carried 
out."91 Accordingly, in Garner, the Court balanced the state's interest 
in apprehending fleeing suspects against the suspect's interest in his 
83. 774 F.2d at 1501. 
84. 775 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1985). 
85. For a description of fourth amendment analysis, see notes 89-91 infra. 
86. In that case, Officer Olson stopped a car driven by Young after observing an apparent 
drug transaction between its occupants and a pedestrian. After the officer told the occupants to 
step out, Young reached down to the floorboard of his car. Officer Olson then shot and killed 
Young, erroneously believing that he was reaching for a gun. The district court found that 
officer Olson had created the need to use deadly force by violating at least six police procedures, 
such as abandoning a covered position and advancing into the open. 775 F.2d at 1351. 
87. 775 F.2d at 1353. 
88. The Chief Justice stated that "an officer's conduct which makes the need for deadly force 
more likely does not constitutionally disable the officer from later using deadly force to defend 
himself." Sampson v. Gilmere, 476 U.S. 1124, 1125 (1986). 
89. The text of the fourth amendment is set out in note 11 supra. 
90. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983). 
91. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985). The Garner Court elaborated that "the ques-
tion was whether the totality of the circumstances justified a particular sort of search or seizure." 
471 U.S. at 8-9 (emphasis added). This consideration of the manner of the search as an element 
in the balancing test was not an innovation of the Garner Court. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 
U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (seizure must be "carefully tailored to [its] underlying justification") (the 
Court deemed unconstitutional an otherwise lawful "seizure" of a suspect's luggage because the 
officers negligently kept the luggage longer than necessary). 
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own life. However, in assessing the state's interest in apprehending 
the suspect, the Court looked not merely to the state's interest in 
catching a potential criminal, but also to its interest in catching him in 
the manner that it did.92 Indeed, the best way to understand the 
"manner" aspect of the balancing test is by considering its relationship 
to the strength of the state's interest.93 The Garner Court recognized 
that the state had a strong interest in apprehending fleeing felons, 94 
but seemed to discount that interest to the extent that it found the 
government's method "unproductive."95 From this viewpoint, the 
Court concluded that the use of deadly force to stop an unarmed, flee-
ing felon could not outweigh the suspect's interest in his own life.96 
This same fourth amendment analysis, applied in evaluating an of-
ficer's gross negligence in creating the need to use deadly force, indi-
cates that such conduct constitutes a violation of the fourth 
amendment. A state can have little interest in apprehending a suspect 
through the use of deadly force when such force is unnecessary. While 
the state does have an interest in allowing its officers sufficient discre-
tion in determining the means they use in apprehending suspects, a 
gross negligence standard allows such freedom. 97 A gross negligence 
standard,98 by permitting an officer to act with simple negligence, al-
lows him sufficient freedom of action in performing his duties, because 
it allows him to commit acts inadvertently without fear of civil liabil-
ity. The state's interest in providing an officer even more freedom of 
action is therefore insignificant. A suspect, on the other hand, has a 
large interest in his own life. Indeed, the Supreme Court, in Garner, 
reasoned that "[t]he intrusiveness of a seizure by means of deadly 
force is unmatched," and that a "suspect's fundamental interest in his 
own life need not be elaborated upon."99 Because fourth amendment 
balancing requires that the government interest rise in relation to an 
amplified individual interest, 100 an officer's gross negligence in the ere-
92. 471 U.S. at 9-10. 
93. Although the Gamer court treated the police's method as more a general consideration 
than an independent factor to be balanced, see note 91 supra, the Supreme Court has in other 
cases treated the method as an independent factor. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 
(1979) (courts should take into account "the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in 
which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted"). 
94. Gamer, 471 U.S. at 9 n.8, 10. 
95. The Court stated that "we are not convinced that the use of deadly force is a sufficiently 
productive means of accomplishing [its goals] to justify the killing of nonviolent suspects .••. 
[T)he fact that the police arrive a little late or are a little slower afoot does not always justify 
killing the suspect." 741 U.S. 10-11 (emphasis added). 
96. 471 U.S. at 11. 
97. See note 69 supra. 
98. For a definition, see notes 68-70 supra and accompanying text. 
99. 471 U.S. at 9. 
100. The Gamer Court held that an officer may use deadly force against a suspect only if the 
suspect poses a roughly reciprocal danger to the officer or a third party; that is, an officer may use 
deadly force to stop a fleeing felon where "the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, 
August 1988) Note - Police Liability 1999 
ation of the need to use deadly force should be deemed an impermissi-
ble seizure under the fourth amendment. 
There is an alternative interpretation of Garner, but it does not 
affect this conclusion. A strong argument exists that the Garner court 
did not mandate this type of pure balancing, but that the case was 
more an expression of revulsion to (and prohibition of) unnecessary 
killing. 101 After all, if the police officer does not shoot the fleeing 
felon, the police may have one more unsolved crime on their hands, 
but nobody will die. Certain language in the opinion suggests that the 
Court was more concerned about this fundamental arithmetic than 
about the more delicate balancing of interests, discounted by efficien-
cies. For example, it remonstrated that "[i]t is not better that all fel-
ony suspects die than that they escape."102 Shooting a fleeing felon, in 
other words, would not be constitutionally permissible even if that 
were the only way of catching him. Moreover, as previously men-
tioned, the Court states: "The suspect's fundamental interest in his 
own life need not be elaborated upon." 103 This uncharacteristically 
emotional and demonstrative statement suggests that a suspect's life 
will never lose a balancing contest against an abstract state interest. 
However, under this logic, perhaps the only time that an officer may 
shoot a fleeing felon is if another life is involved to counterbalance the 
consideration of the suspect's life. The Garner Court would, in fact, 
permit an officer to shoot a fleeing felon when he "has probable cause 
to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, 
either to the officer or to others."104 
Superficially, this alternative interpretation seems to suggest that 
an officer has not violated the suspect's constitutional rights if he cre-
ates the need to use deadly force. Unlike the situation in Garner, the 
officer's life appears, or reasonably appears, to be threatened in every 
case. However, a closer look reveals that this alternative interpreta-
tion of Garner does not suggest that the court saw such conduct as 
consistent with fourth amendment principles. This becomes apparent 
when one distinguishes between the officer's act of creating the need 
for deadly force and his separate act of firing his weapon in defense of 
his life. The latter act - the officer's defense of his life - is not chal-
lenged, since it is clearly justifiable in fourth amendment terms by the 
officer's need to protect his own life. The officer's prior act of creating 
either to the officer or to others." Gamer, 471 U.S. at 11. This form of balancing is consistent 
with other fourth amendment decisions. See Note, Tennessee v. Gamer-The Use of Deadly 
Force To Arrest as an Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 65 N.C. L. REV. 155, 165 (1986). 
101. This interpretation comports with the view that Gamer "may have been motivated pri-
marily by the compelling facts of the case." The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 120, 244 (1985). 
102. 471 U.S. at 11. 
103. 471 U.S. at 9. 
104. 471 U.S at 11. 
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the need to use deadly force, however, is not justifiable by his, or by 
society's, interest in protecting his life. 105 At the moment this act was 
committed, the officer's life was not threatened. Recognizing that the 
officer has committed two separate acts, the act of gross negligence 
and the act of self-defense, means that the alternative interpretation of 
Garner does not affect the conclusion. An officer should still be held 
constitutionally liable for his gross negligence in creating the need to 
use deadly force. 
Although this second interpretation of Garner does not affect the 
analysis relating to the officer's liability, it does shed light on Chief 
Justice Burger's dissent from denial of certiorari in Gilmere v. City of 
Atlanta. 106 For it is this second interpretation of Garner that he had 
in mind when he stated that "an officer's conduct which makes the 
need for deadly force more likely does not constitutionally disable the 
officer from later using deadly force to defend himself." 107 He appar-
ently believed that this was a situation where the consideration for the 
suspect's life was counterbalanced by consideration for the officer's 
life. Unfortunately, he failed to see the distinction between the of-
ficer's act of gross negligence and his act of self-defense. Burger failed 
to recognize that holding the officer liable for his gross negligence does 
not "disable" - or otherwise affect - the officer's ability to defend 
himself. The Chief Justice would probably have thought differently 
had he been confronted with facts like those in Young v. City of Kil-
leen, 108 where the suspect never actually tried to harm the officer, 
rather than those of Gilmere, where the suspect did try to harm the 
policeman. In Killeen, the officer violated police procedure, inter alia, 
by stepping away from the cover of his police cruiser. As a result, he 
had to shoot and kill the suspect when he erroneously thought the 
suspect was reaching for a gun. 109 Because the officer's life was never 
in any actual danger, there was no question of concern for the sus-
pect's life being counterbalanced by consideration of the officer's 
life.110 
105. The situation where the officer's gross negligence creates the need to use deadly force in 
self-defense, therefore, is analogous to the cases where the officer's negligence or gross negligence 
directly causes the suspect's death, without the suspect's intervening act of attacking the officer. 
For example, in Leber v. Smith, 773 F.2d IOI (6th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1084 (1986), 
the officer slipped while making an arrest and shot the suspect by accident. The court refused to 
find the officer's apparently simple negligence to be "unreasonable" under the fourth 
amendment. 
106. Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Samp· 
son v. Gilmere, 476 U.S. 1124 (1986). 
107. Sampson v. Gilmere, 476 U.S. 1124, 1125 (1986). 
108. 775 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1985). 
109. See note 86 supra. 
110. The Fifth Circuit nonetheless denied the plaintiff recovery, explaining that "[t]he consti-
tutional right to be free from unreasonable seizure has never been equated by the Court with the 
right to be free from a negligently executed stop or arrest." 775 F.2d at 1353. If the officer was in 
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The Garner Court also expressed concern about the possibility of 
hampering effective law enforcement111 and of requiring police to 
make impossible split-second decisions. 112 Requiring officers to use 
less injurious but equally effective procedures in apprehending sus-
pects would aid, rather than hamper, effective law enforcement. The 
police would achieve the same goals without generating the public dis-
trust that could result from the use of unnecessary force. 113 Nor 
would the officer be required to make impossible split-second deci-
sions. The purpose of permitting an officer to commit acts of negli-
gence without invoking tort liability is to allow him some errors in 
making fast decisions. If courts applied this permissive standard in 
evaluating police conduct, officers would be able to handle such split-
second decisions. 
Despite the often inevitable subjectivity of fourth amendment bal-
ancing, 114 an officer's gross negligence in creating the need to use 
deadly force should always amount to an unreasonable seizure under 
the fourth amendment. This test allows both the state's interest and 
the individual's interest - l?oth factors in the balancing test - to vary 
from one case to another. For example, the state's interest may vary 
positively as a function of the danger the suspect poses to others and 
negatively as a function of the egregiousness of the method it uses to 
apprehend the suspect. In cases involving an officer's gross negligence 
in creating the need to use deadly force, however, the "method" prong 
should in every case weigh so heavily in favor of finding a fourth 
amendment violation that courts would fashion a per se rule that such 
conduct would always violate the fourth amendment. A number of 
federal courts of appeals that have addressed the question have held 
that conduct that amounts to police brutality, even in the context of a 
legitimate arrest, may rise to the level of a fourth amendment viola-
tion.115 Although these courts did not address whether police brutal-
ity will, in every case, constitute a violation of the fourth amendment, 
without regard to the individual ·and state interest prongs of the bal-
ancing test, they do suggest that the "method" employed may be an 
fact merely negligent, then the court reached the correct result. See notes 61-70 & 97-101 supra 
and accompanying text. 
111. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. at 19. 
112. 471 U.S. at 20. 
113. See note 169 infra and accompanying text. 
114. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 989-
92 (1987) (discussing Garner); The Supreme Court - Leading Cases, supra note 101, at 244 
(suggesting that Garner itself "may have been motivated primarily by the compelling facts of the 
case"); Note, supra note 100, at 159 ("By its nature, the balancing test is relatively formless, 
subjective, and, in part, based on a common sense judgment."). 
115. See, e.g., Waggoner v. Mosti, 792 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1986); Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 
1004 (9th Cir. 1985); Kidd v. O'Neil, 774 F.2d 1252 (4th Cir. 1985). But see Leber v. Smith, 773 
F.2d 101 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1084 (1986) (officer slipped and shot suspect by 
accident in making arrest: held not to violate fourth amendment). 
2002 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:1982 
important and sometimes controlling factor in the balancing test. 116 
Moreover, the degree to which governmental action represents a 
threat to individual liberties is a central concern of the fourth amend-
ment.117 Officers who act with more than mere inadvertence in disre-
garding the safety of the public represent a serious threat to individual 
liberties, 118 and this threat heightens the individual's already strong 
interest in having an effective remedy to the abuse of police discretion. 
Consistent application of a gross negligence standard in such cases 
would also fulfill the need to provide police officers with fixed stan-
dards to guide their actions. 119 The goal of providing police with clear 
guidance would be especially well served by application of such a per 
se rule to the extent that the same standard is applied in state law tort 
actions.120 
B. Due Process Clause 
Courts have also looked to the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment, 121 in evaluating an officer's conduct that creates the need 
to use deadly force in self-defense. This section will focus on the eval-
uation of such conduct in terms of "substantive" due process analy-
sis.122 The Supreme Court has limited the scope of procedural due 
process analysis, and therefore that analysis is not useful in most cases 
involving an officer's creation of the need to use deadly force. 123 This 
116. The California Supreme Court, for example, has held that use of a motorized battering 
ram is a per se unconstitutional method of conducting a "search" under the fourth amendment if 
employed without the explicit permission of a federal magistrate. Langford v. Superior Court 
(Gates), 43 Cal. 3d 21, 729 P.2d 822, 233 Cal. Rptr. 387, cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 87 (1987). 
117. See, e.g .• Bissonette v. Haig, 776 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1985) (the use of the military to 
conduct searches and seizures, rather than police, heightens the need for application of fourth 
amendment protections, since the military represents a greater threat to individual liberties than 
do civilian police officers), ajfd. on rehearing, 800 F.2d 812 (8th Cir. 1986), ajfd. memo, 108 S. 
Ct. 1253 (1988) (affirmed without quorum under 28 U.S.C. § 2109). 
118. See notes 3 & 5 supra. 
119. In her dissent in Gamer, Justice O'Connor criticizes the majority for not providing the 
police with the "critical factors in the decision to use deadly force." 471 U.S. at 32. 
120. See notes 61-70 supra and accompanying text. 
121. The relevant clause of the fourteenth amendment states that no state shall "deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw." U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV,§ 1. 
122. While procedural due process is primarily concerned with guaranteeing fair procedures, 
substantive due process is concerned with guaranteeing certain substantive rights. J. ELY, DE-
MOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 14-21 (1980). The doctrine of 
substantive due process has been under attack by Ely and other commentators and courts. See 
note 155 infra. 
123. The First Circuit, which did consider procedural due process analysis in confronting 
this question, resolved the issue on other grounds. Voutour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812, 818 n.4 (!st 
Cir. 1985) (found defendant-officer entitled to summary judgment on the basis of a good·faith 
immunity, so did not resolve whether an officer's "negligence" or "gross negligence" in creating 
the need to use deadly force may represent a procedural violation of due process), cert. denied, 
474 U.S. 1100 (1986). 
In Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), the Supreme Court held that a random and unau-
thorized "deprivation" of a constitutionally protected interest is not "without due process of 
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section concludes that courts should not apply substantive due process 
analysis in this context because it duplicates the fourth amendment 
analysis, and because it is too subjective and arbitrary to give police 
adequate guidance. 
In Rochin v. California, 124 the Supreme Court determined that po-
lice conduct that "shocks the conscience"125 violates substantive rights 
embodied in the due process clause.126 Attempting to clarify this 
vague standard in Johnson v. Glick, 127 Judge Friendly announced what 
has become the prevailing test in cases concerning the use of excessive 
force by police. Judge Friendly stated: 
In determining whether the constitutional line has been crossed, a court 
must look to such factors as the need for the application of the force, the 
relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, the 
extent of injury inflicted, and whether force was applied in a good faith 
effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for 
the very purpose of causing harm. 128 
The Eleventh and Tenth Circuits have applied substantive due pro-
cess analysis in evaluating an officer's conduct in creating the need to 
law" under the fourteenth amendment so long as the state provides an "adequate" remedy. The 
use of excessive force by a police officer is such an unauthorized act so long as the officer is not 
acting pursuant to an official state policy. Since the tort law of most states can be expected to 
provide an adequate remedy, a suspect alleging excessive use of force in most cases will be unable 
to predicate a section 1983 claim on a procedural due process theory. It should be noted, how-
ever, that there is some controversy over whether Parratt should be read to apply to deprivations 
of "liberty" or "life" interests, or whether it should be limited to deprivations of "property" 
interests, which were at issue in Parratt. Note, Due Process: Application of the Parratt Doctrine 
to Random and Unauthorized Deprivations of Life and Liberty, 52 FORDHAM L. REv 887 (1984) 
(arguing that Parratt does apply to cases involving life and liberty interests); see also Wilson v. 
Beebe, 770 F.2d 578, 584 (6th Cir. 1985) (arguing that "the conclusion that [Parratt's} holding 
applies only to the deprivation of property lacks foundation); Leber v. Smith, 773 F.2d 101 (6th 
Cir. 1985) (same), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1084 (1986). But see Brewer v. Blackwell, 692 F.2d 
387, 394-95 (5th Cir. 1982) (arguing that Parratt does not apply to cases involving intentional 
deprivation of "liberty"). See generally Monaghan, State Law Wrongs, State Law Remedies, and 
the Fourteenth Amendment, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 979 (1986) (criticizing Parratt). 
A section 1983 claim predicated on a procedural due process theory may also be barred by 
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), holding that "the Due Process Clause is simply not 
implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or 
property." 474 U.S. at 328 (emphasis in original); see also Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 
(1986) (companion case). Accordingly, a negligent act relating to the use of excessive force or 
creation of the need to use excessive force is clearly not a "deprivation" for the purposes of the 
fourteenth amendment. The Court, moreover, may interpret negligence to include "gross 
negligence." 
124. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
125. 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). The Court elaborated that such conduct must "do more than 
offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime too en-
ergetically." 342 U.S. at 172. 
126. In Rochin, the police extracted two capsules (needed as evidence) from the suspect's 
stomach by forcing medicine into his stomach so that he would vomit. The Court held that this 
conduct violated the due process clause. 
127. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.) cerL denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). 
1'28. 481 F.2d at 1033; see Comment, Excessive Force Claims: Removing the Double Stan-
dard, 53 u. CHI. L. REV. 1369, 1371 (1986). 
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use deadly force in self-defense. Applying such an analysis in Gilmere 
v. City of Atlanta, 129 the Eleventh Circuit found that the officer's con-
duct in creating the need to use deadly force violated the due process 
clause and gave rise to a section 1983 claim. In that case, defendant-
officer Sampson and officer Craig, a colleague, started to bring Patillo, 
plaintiff's decedent, to their patrol car for questioning.130 The police 
intended to question him about a report that he had threatened a third 
party with a gun. Patillo, however, attempted to flee and then began 
"flailing" his arms in resistance.131 In part, apparently, because Pa-
tillo was intoxicated, the officers quickly regained control and began to 
escort Patillo "by force." 132 They also began to beat him about the 
head. Apparently in response to the beating, Patillo again tried to 
flee. 133 A scuffle ensued, during which Patillo lunged at officer Samp-
son. Sampson reacted by shooting and killing Patillo.134 
The Tenth Circuit, however, applied substantive due process anal-
ysis in Hewitt v. City of Truth or Consequences135 and concluded that 
the defendant-officer should not be liable for his conduct in creating 
the need to use deadly force. The plaintiff in that case alleged that 
defendant-officers "negligently"136 searched,137 handcuffed,13s and se-
cured139 Hewitt, the plaintiff's decedent, so that he was able to escape 
from the back of a parked police car with a nonshooting starter pistol 
hidden in his boot. 140 After escaping, Hewitt pointed the pistol at 
himself and threatened to commit suicide. 141 One of the officers, 
Sarembar, pointed a shotgun at Hewitt and told him to drop his pis-
129. 774 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1985), cerL denied, 476 U.S. 1124 (1986). 
130. 774 F.2d at 1496-97. 
131. 774 :f.2d at 1497. 
132. 774 F.2d at 1497. The term "by force" probably means that they held him tightly and 
pulled him along. 
133. The trial court and court of appeals apparently believed that the beating caused Patillo 
to try to flee. The court of appeals, in upholding the trial court's decision to hold defendant-
officer liable for the shooting (in addition to liability for the beating alone), stated that "a mo-
ment of legitimate fear should not preclude liability for a harm which largely resulted from his 
own improper use of his official power." 774 F.2d at 1501. 
134. 774 F.2d at 1497. 
135. 758 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844 (1985). 
136. The plaintiffs apparently specifically alleged negligence. See 758 F.2d at 1378. 
137. One of the officers apparently had searched Hewitt twice, the second time finding a 
pistol grip in Hewitt's front pocket, but not the starter pistol Hewitt later pointed at the officers. 
758 F.2d at 1377. 
138. One of the officers had originally handcuffed Hewitt with his hands behind his back. 
After Hewitt worked his hands around in front of him, that officer readjusted Hewitt's cuffs but 
did not recuff his hands behind his back. 758 F.2d at 1377. 
139. Officer "Calahan testified at trial that he knew it was possible for someone in the back 
seat of the car [where he put Hewitt) to get out of the locked vehicle by reaching through a gap in 
the metal grid and manipulating the lock mechanism." 758 F.2d at 1377. 
140. 758 F.2d at 1378. 
141. 758 F.2d at 1377-78. 
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tol. 142 Hewitt then turned and aimed his gun at Sarembar, who re-
sponded by firing his shotgun and killing Hewitt. 143 
The results in these cases seem intuitively correct, but the courts 
did not apply objective standards. The Gilmere case involved allega-
tions of police brutality, so that the resulting harm somehow seems 
"shocking to the conscience,"144 or at least more so than the "negli-
gent"145 conduct alleged in Hewitt. Yet a close look at the standards 
the courts used reveals the arbitrary and inherently subjective nature 
of substantive due process analysis. 146 In Gilmere, the court separated 
the issues regarding the officers' liability for beating the suspect from 
their liability for shooting the suspect in self-defense, and it affirmed 
the officers' liability on both grounds. It rationalized holding the of-
ficers liable for the shooting because "a moment of legitimate fear 
should not preclude liability for a harm which largely resulted from 
his own improper use of his official power."147 This statement, how-
ever, is more an expression of moral indignation than a standard; the 
court seems to be saying that the officer should suffer (or be liable for) 
the consequences of his own wrongdoing. Even though it separated 
the allegations relating to the beating from those relating to the shoot-
ing, the court seems to have been outrageCI by the beating from used 
that outrage as a basis for holding the officers liable on both grounds. 
The court never really focused on the officers' degree of culpability 
with regard to the shooting.148 As a practical consequence, this stan-
dard could support the liability of any officer courts consider culpable 
(through negligence, gross negligence, recklessness or worse) for caus-
142. 758 F.2d at 1378. 
143. 758 F.2d at 1378. 
144. This is the standard the Supreme Court set out in Rochin v. California for evaluating 
police conduct pursuant to substantive due process analysis. See notes 124-26 supra. The test set 
out by Judge Friendly in Johnson v. Glick is widely applied but is not mandatory, since Johnson is 
not a Supreme Court opinion. See note 128 supra and accompanying text. 
145. This was the plaintiff's characterization of that conduct. Hewitt, 758 F.2d at 1378. 
146. Commentators have criticized substantive due process analysis on these grounds. See 
note 155 infra. 
147. Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1501. 
148. The court never asked whether the officers, in beating the suspect, were negligent, 
grossly negligent, reckless, or worse, in creating the need to use deadly force. It is not clear that 
beating a suspect about the head after he tries to run away will cause him to try to run away 
again. Normally, "punishing" a suspect for trying to escape would prevent him from trying 
again, even if he is intoxicated. This is an empirical question to which there is no clear, nonintui-
tive answer, but the very question highlights the fact that the court ignored the question entirely. 
The court made the same mistake that Chief Justice Burger made in his dissent from denial of 
certiorari in Gilmere. In that dissent, the Chief Justice confused the officer's conduct in creating 
the need to use deadly force with his right to defend himself, in effect absolving him of liability 
with regard to his first action because of his privilege with regard to the second action. See notes 
107-10 supra and accompanying text. In effect, the Gilmere court did the same thing, but in 
reverse, when it focused on the officers' culpability for beating the suspect as justification for 
holding them liable both for the beating and for the shooting. 
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ing the need to use deadly force. As discussed in Part II, 149 however, 
this may not be the best approach. The fact that the court's standard 
seems to be more an expression of moral indignation may be an inevi-
table result of the fundamental subjectivity of the "shocks the con-
science" standard. The court in Gilmere, moreover, did not explicitly 
discuss the Johnson factors, except to point out that the trial court 
"noted ... such action [by the police officers] clearly implicated at 
least one of the Johnson factors in that the injury inflicted constituted 
the most serious harm possible."150 
The Hewitt court applied a standard as subjective and arbitrary as 
that applied in Gilmere, although it differed in form. In Hewitt, the 
Tenth Circuit first suggested that it was going to consider whether the 
Johnson factors indicated that the conduct represented a denial of sub-
stantive due process, 151 but it ultimately ignored the factors entirely in 
favor of considering whether the conduct represented an "abuse of 
state power." This language, which the court borrowed from a proce-
dural due process case, 152 is vague at best. Like the "standard" ap-
plied by the Gilmere court, it invites the court to decide according to 
its own subjective opinion. Indeed, the court did not attempt to ex-
plain why the officer's actions did not represent an "abuse of state 
power" but, like the Gilmere court, merely stated with certainty that 
"[w]herever th[e] line may be drawn, the conduct complained of here 
simply is not an abuse of power condemned by the Constitution."153 
Although the fact that these decisions seem intuitively correct may lull 
an observer into believing that the courts are applying objective stan-
dards, a closer look at the courts' rationales indicates that the "shocks 
the conscience" standard is, as Judge Easterbrook has stated, "a vague 
standard . . . inviting decisionmakers to consult their sensibilities 
rather than objective circumstances."154 
These two cases demonstrate that a substantive due process analy-
149. See Part II supra. 
150. Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1501. 
151. Although not citing Johnson, it considered similar factors "relevant," though appar-
ently not conclusive. Hewitt, 158 F.2d at 1379. 
152. The court borrowed the language from Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). The 
court may have been anticipating the Supreme Court's recent holding that negligence may not 
constitute a deprivation of procedural due process. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 
(1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986). Even if this is true, however, that holding is 
not directly relevant in a substantive due process case. Although a court may conclude that 
negligence is not enough to constitute a violation of substantive due process, that conclusion has 
not been mandated by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1409 
(7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (arguing that certain limitations on application of 
procedural due process analysis should be applied in substantive due process cases as well, even 
though the Seventh Circuit had decided that it is not bound by precedent to do so), cert. denied, 
475 U.S. 1123 (1986). 
153. Hewitt, 758 F.2d at 1379. 
154. Gumz 772 F.2d at 1407 (Easterbrook, J., concurring). 
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sis is inherently arbitrary and subjective.155 The possibility that courts 
will apply such a subjective analysis in evaluating the conduct of po-
lice in creating the need to use deadly force undermines the goal of 
providing officers with clear guidance.156 Police officers will be unable 
to predict when certain conduct will "shock the conscience" of a par-
ticular judge. It may be true that, as a matter of theory, only conduct 
that violates the fourth amendment under Garner may be found to 
violate substantive due process. That suggests that officers need only 
guide themselves according to the law provided by fourth amendment 
jurisprudence in order to protect themselves from liability under sub-
stantive due process.157 As a practical matter, however, a court apply-
ing substantive due process analysis may impose liability even when 
fourth amendment analysis does not suggest that result. 158 Indeed, the 
court in Hewitt considered the possibility of finding a violation of sub-
stantive due process in a case where the officer acts with simple negli-
gence, 159 a situation where courts should not impose fourth 
amendment liability. 160 If, therefore, the fourth amendment balancing 
155. Professor Ely believes that due process is about procedure, not substantive rights, and 
should be applied only when questions of fair procedure arise. To say "substantive due process," 
he points out, "is a contradiction in terms - sort of like 'green pastel redness.' " J. ELY, supra 
note 122, at 18 (emphasis added). Judge Easterbrook agrees that due process should be about 
procedure and has pointed out that "[s]ubstantive due process is a shorthand for a judicial privi-
lege to condemn things the judges do not like or cannot understand.'' Gumz, 772 F.2d at 1406. 
See also Comment, supra note 128, at 1389-92 (arguing that substantive due process analysis 
should no longer be applied to claims concerning excessive force during arrest). 
156. Courts and commentators have underscored the value of providing police officers with 
sufficiently clear rules by which to guide their conduct. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 
1, 20, 32 (1985) (both the majority and the dissent agree that clear guidance is an important 
goal); LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures'~· The Robinson 
Dilemma, 1974 SUP. Cr. REv. 127 (arguing that the Supreme Court should take advantage of 
opportunities for establishing generalized rules for police in cases dealing with fourth amendment 
issues, rather than relying on case-by-case adjudication). But see Alschuler, Bright Line Fever 
and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 227 (1984) (arguing in favor of case-by-case 
adjudication; suggesting that police are more confused by hundreds of categorical bright-line 
rules). 
157. Because the balancing test is roughly equivalent to one of the three factors in Judge 
Friendly's substantive due process test set out in Johnson, an act cannot theoretically violate 
substantive due process unless it also violates the fourth amendment. See Gumz, 772 F.2d at 
1404-09 (Judge Easterbrook argues in concurring opinion that fourth amendment analysis 
should apply instead of substantive due process analysis); Comment, supra note 128, at 1381-86 
(arguing that substantive due process analysis should not be applied in arrest-related excessive 
force claims because it is duplicative of fourth amendment analysis). 
158. Courts outside the Second Circuit - as both Hewitt and Gilmere demonstrate - are 
free to ignore the Johnson factors, in part or in whole, and rely entirely on the Supreme Court's 
"shocks the conscience" $tandard set out in Rochin, which is vague and inherently subjective. 
See notes 145-55 supra and accompanying text. As a practical matter, therefore, judges have a 
great amount of discretion in finding a violation of substantive due process even where there is 
not a violation of the fourth amendment. 
159. 'Hewitt, 158 F.2d at 1379. The Court did not answer its own question concerning 
whether negligence is sufficient for imposing substantive due process liability, since it decided for 
other reasons that such liability could not be imposed. 758 F.2d at 1379. 
160. This Note proposes that only acts of gross negligence should be subject to fourth 
amendment liability. See Part III.A supra. 
2008 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:1982 
test is susceptible to clear, universal rulemaking (as this Note argues), 
then the application of substantive due process analysis will interfere 
with an opportunity to provide police officers with the guidance they 
require. 
Exclusive application of the fourth amendment balancing test in 
arrest-related excessive force cases would provide police officers with 
relatively clear guidance. Although commentators have also charac-
terized the fourth amendment balancing test as arbitrary and subjec-
tive, 161 it is more predictable and less subjective than substantive due 
process analysis. 162 Further, since one of the three factors a court 
must consider in applying the fourth amendment balancing test is the 
method the police use in carrying out their objective, some types of 
cases may be subject to per se rules or presumptions making liability 
depend on whether the officer's method reflects a particular common 
law level of culpability - such as negligence, gross negligence, or 
recklessness. 163 As this Note proposes, it is possible to create a per se 
rule that an officer who, with gross negligence, creates the need to use 
deadly force in self-defense will be subject to liability under the fourth 
amendment. 164 This outcome arises because a method of gross negli-
gence will, in every case, discount the state's interest in apprehending 
the suspect. The state has little interest in achieving a certain end by 
means of gross negligence when it can achieve the same end without 
such negligence, and without causing harm.165 Its primary interest is 
in allowing its officers sufficient discretion, an interest which is ade-
quately served by allowing officers to act with simple negligence with-
out fear of liability. 
Substantive due process analysis, moreover, is essentially duplica-
tive of fourth amendment liability. This is true especially to the extent 
that courts apply the three Johnson factors. These factors are (1) the 
need for the force, (2) the relationship between that need and the 
161. See note 114 supra. 
162. As Judge Easterbrook pointed out: 
The notorious difficulties in defining reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment are insig-
nificant compared to the randomness that flows from asking people what shocks their con-
sciences. Reasonableness is an open-ended approach, to be sure, but it has roots in tort law. 
It calls for an objective balancing of the harms from the arrest ..• against the potential 
harms to effective law enforcement of delaying the action or not acting at all. The graver the 
crime ... the more the police can do .... 
. . • There is now a tremendous body of precedent dealing with searches and seizures, and 
these cases furnish rules that ought to be sufficient guidance in [such cases.] 
Gumz v. Morrissett, 772 F.2d at 1406, 1407 (Easterbrook, J., concurring); see also Comment, 
supra note 128, at 1385-86. 
163. For explanation of these terms, see notes 63-70 supra and accompanying text. 
164. The second interpretation of Garner, see notes 101-04 supra, suggests that even acts of 
simple negligence should invoke fourth amendment liability, since it suggests that all unneces-
sary deaths are "unreasonable" under that amendment. It is unlikely, however, that any court 
would carry the implications of this second interpretation so far as to chill police discretion. 
165. See notes 98-100 supra and accompanying text. 
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amount of force used, and (3) whether the force was used in good faith 
or for malicious reasons.166 Because the second factor is essentially 
the same as the fourth amendment balancing test, any act deemed a 
deprivation of substantive due process must necessarily be "unreason-
able" under the fourth amendment, as long as the court is applying the 
Johnson factors.1 67 Accordingly, not only is substantive due process 
analysis inherently subjective, as pointed out earlier, but it is also po-
tentially duplicative. A court should, therefore, evaluate an officer's 
conduct in creating the need to use deadly force in terms of fourth 
amendment analysis to the exclusion of substantive due process 
analysis. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The excessive use of force by police can generate anger and dis-
trust. This anger was reflected in some of the language in the Garner 
opinion. 168 Taking a more practical view, one former police commis-
sioner explained that the use of excessive force "interfered with the 
strenuous efforts being made to still strife between the ... Police De-
partment and the citizens it served."169 
In a few instances, this anger and "strife" have resulted in calls for 
criminal prosecution of the officers involved. This Note has tried to 
demonstrate, however, that imposition of criminal sanctions is nor-
mally unfair to the police and bad social policy. Recourse to state tort 
law and to constitutional tort law would be more fair and effective. 
Furthermore, application of a gross negligence standard would appro-
priately take into consideration the officers' simultaneous need for dis-
cretion and clear guidance. In imposing constitutional tort liability, 
however, a court should apply fourth amendment analysis to the ex-
clusion of substantive due process analysis, since application of the 
latter analysis would undermine the officers' need for clear guidance. 
- Frank G. Zarb, Jr. 
166. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). 
167. See Comment, supra note 128, at 1383-85. It is important to note, however, that it is 
quite possible, though perhaps unlikely, for a court to find that an act violates substantive due 
process and not the fourth amendment. See notes 158-60 supra and accompanying text. 
168. See notes 102-03 supra and accompanying text. 
169. Edwards, supra note 3, at 733. 
